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d e a r  a l u m n i  a n d  f r i e n d s ,
he school year is upon us. This fall, mixed with the usual excitement and 
anticipation, there is some relief as we come to the close of a summer filled with 
dust and hammering from three major building projects on the second floor 
of the Law School. With the support of the university, and with funds from 
alumni and friends, we have built a beautiful new trial courtroom, a spacious 
student commons, and a large, quiet, study area in our library, which replaces a 
similar area on the fourth floor that will now be used for Law School conferences 
and symposia. Each project addresses long-standing student and Law School needs, 
and—exciting to me—their functional value is matched by their aesthetic quality. 
I am eager for you to drop by the Law School to see the improvements. The trial 
courtroom is particularly stunning, with finely detailed cherry-wood millwork and 
all of the latest trial practice technologies.
 It is hard not to feel excitement about the aesthetic and technical advances these projects represent, but I hope a sum-
mer of hard hats has not gone to my head. This school, after all, welcomed its first class to the St. Francis Elementary 
School on Ninth East. The core of a legal education is not found in the construction of courtrooms and commons but 
in the construction and development of critical and analytical thinking skills. That construction project, which likewise 
can involve disruption and indeed some hammering, is one that goes on every year and is surely the most important “con-
struction project” this fall.
 Understood in its proper frame, I hope, improving the quality of the space in which students learn can have impor-
tant symbolic value. The careful workmanship of the craftsmen who have done the molding and carving of the cherry 
millwork is, perhaps, a reminder of the careful craftsmanship that is required of a successful lawyer. Attention to detail 
matters. Understanding both the narrow frame of a particular panel, as well as how one frame (or analytical point) fits the 
entire project, matters.
 Perhaps I focus on the symbolism because I am eager to explore additional ways to improve the physical spaces in which 
students learn and engage at the Law School. I’d love, for example, to see more natural light. In fact, in arming myself for 
discussions with the university, I did some research on the value of natural light in learning environments and was interested 
to find studies suggesting that students in purely fluorescent-light environments were shorter on average and more prone to 
dental decay. All will likely be relieved to learn that I have not led with an argument for producing taller law students with 
whiter teeth, but the idea of bringing more light to the Law School is an appealing project. Ultimately, of course, any effort 
to bring physical light to the Law School remains secondary to the primary occupation of learning and discovering more 
powerful light and truth and then taking it from the Law School as the guide by which to serve and to lead.
 The Law School continues to be blessed with extraordinarily fine materials for our long-term construction project. 
The class that joins us this fall is highly accomplished and capable of building with the same quality as those who have 
gone before them. As described in further detail in our forthcoming Law School Annual Report, our faculty continue to 
devote themselves to their craft, investing in the students and in advancing knowledge in their respective areas of the law. 
And, as my experience with graduates across the country attests, the service and leadership of our alumni are evidence 
that, in the most important sense, light has been incorporated into the Law School construction project.
      Warm regards,
 
           j a m e s  r .  r a s b a n d
d e a n ’s  m e s s a g e
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 b y  j u d g e  m i c h a e l  w.  m o s m a n * 
i l l u s t r a t i o n s  b y  j o n  c.  l u n d
t used to be the case that one of the main,           stated goals of law school was to teach 
the young acolytes how to “think like a lawyer.” I’m not sure quite as much is made of this 
in today’s law schools, perhaps because figuring out exactly what that phrase means is not 
easy, and lawyers tend to abandon projects they cannot explain with precision. Still, the idea 
endures that we have a way of thinking about things that sets us apart, that can be taught, 
and that serves us well. And I think there is some truth to it.  >>  I’m not going to attempt a pre-
cise explanation today of what it means to think like a lawyer. But I am going to talk about some 
traits of lawyers’ minds and suggest that while 
they can be useful, they have their downside. For 
this reason, only two cheers.  >>  I want to discuss 
three traits of thinking like a lawyer and show 
their strengths. But then I want to turn these 
traits on their heads and show their weaknesses.
I
The following remarks were presented  
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a s s u m e  n o t h i n g
One trait of the lawyer mind is to 
assume nothing. The classic story 
that used to be told about this trait 
was of the senior partner and the 
young associate traveling on a 
train together. The young lawyer 
looks out the window and says, “Look, all 
the sheep have been sheared,” to which the 
wise old partner replies, “Well, at least on one 
side.” While the trait of assuming nothing 
can be annoying to others and frustrating to 
young lawyers, it has its uses. 
 For one thing, it combats groupthink, 
or commonly held assumptions—the things 
everybody knows but are actually unexam-
ined; such as the commonly held assump-
tion in a community that John Doe is guilty 
of some notorious crime or that Jane Doe 
is incapable of harming a flea. The law-
yer approaches such assumptions with an 
open mind: the task is to break down what 
we know about what happened into com-
ponent parts, assume nothing, and exam-
ine the facts with care. I once heard Paul 
Fortino, a partner at Perkins Coie who rep-
resented Guantanamo detainees, say it this 
way: “I felt that as to my client, terrorist is a 
question, not an answer.”
 I remember in my first year of law 
school when I first realized this was a way 
of thinking that lawyers knew and I didn’t. I 
had a criminal law professor named Woody 
Deem, a former star practitioner with an 
unorthodox style. One part of his unortho-
doxy was the pop quiz. That day’s quiz was 
on larceny, the taking and carrying away of 
the personal property of another with the 
intent to permanently deprive the owner 
of it. The quiz involved a man breaking in, 
grabbing the homeowner’s baby, discard-
ing the blanket and pacifier, and running 
out of the house into the cold night with 
a baby wearing only a diaper. I thought 
I had law school figured out; it was clear 
to me that the trick was that the man had 
not stolen any personal property, just the 
baby. Of course, I got the question wrong. 
In a later phone call to my dad, a lawyer, I 
complained about the ridiculous question. 
I explained it to him, and by the time I got 
to the discarded blanket, he interrupted me 
and asked, “Was there a diaper? Because 
that would be larceny.” 
 This pattern of thinking, of assuming 
nothing and examining everything, isn’t 
unique to lawyers. We share it with good 
economists and with legendary figures like 
Perry Mason, Sherlock Holmes, Colombo, 
and Monk. 
 While we have discussed this as “assum-
ing nothing,” we are really nudging up 
against a question of epistemology: How 
do we know what we think we know? And 
what is the core point of epistemology? As 
the inimicable Tyler Cowan put it, “You 
are wrong so, so, so often. This is, or rather 
should be, the central lesson of epistemology 
[and, I would add, a good legal education]. It 
is a lesson which hardly anybody ever learns.” 
 What would a thoughtful trial lawyer 
have learned along these lines? Here is my 
partial list:
1. That eyewitnesses are sometimes dead 
wrong and are often wrong on important 
details
2. That honest people can remember the 
same events differently
3. That the same facts can give rise to very 
different inferences
4. That in even the most ordinary historical 
events, it can be very difficult to figure out 
what happened
5. That in most debates, the best argument 
has serious flaws, while the worst argument 
has undeniable strengths
6. That in a tight spot most people will still 
try to be truthful
7.  That you don’t really know something—
or even less, know it’s true—just because 
you read it somewhere
8. That most experts don’t know what they 
think they know
 A mind trained along these lines would 
approach most issues and disputes with 
a certain degree of care, of openness to 
change, of willingness to re-examine, of 
unwillingness to assume that anyone who 
disagrees with him or her is an idiot. This 
does not mean that we never come to know 
anything. It does mean that we have a highly 
tuned awareness of the limits on our ability 
to know. It is captured for me in the words 
of Learned Hand, in his 1944 Fourth of July 
speech in Central Park:
 What then is the spirit of liberty? I cannot 
define it; I can only tell you my own faith. The 
spirit of liberty is the spirit which is not too sure that 
it is right; the spirit of liberty is the spirit which seeks 
to understand the minds of other men and women; 
the spirit of liberty is the spirit which weighs their 
interests alongside its own without bias; the spirit 
of liberty remembers that not even a sparrow falls to 
the earth unheeded; the spirit of liberty is the spirit 
of Him who, near two thousand years ago, taught 
mankind the lesson that it has never learned but 
never quite forgotten; that there may be a kingdom 
where the least shall be heard and considered side by 
side with the greatest.
  It’s worth stepping back to ask where this 
lawerly, careful style of thinking comes from. 
That is, what has driven lawyers to think this 
way? In my view, it principally is the prod-
uct of an adversarial system. It is born in the 
dualistic dialectic of trials. The caution that 
is so common to lawyers comes from having 
your every assertion tested and attacked by an 
adversary. In the experience of most people, 
this is unheard of. The average doctor, college 
professor, TV host, cab driver, or contractor 
rarely has a highly motivated, skilled adver-
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sary try to take apart his every assertion, with 
the winner gaining a pot of money. And the 
focus on proof, instead of pronouncement, 
comes from the requirement of meeting a 
certain standard of proof as to each element 
of your case, or you lose.
 In any event, this way of thinking—
focusing on proof, not assumptions, and 
carefully linking your proof to your proposi-
tions—can be very useful. So I commend to 
you the trait of assuming nothing.
e l i m i n a t e  i r r e l e va n c i e s
I want to turn now to a second 
trait of thinking like a lawyer: the 
skill of focusing on what’s rele-
vant and eliminating irrelevan-
cies. Isn’t this, in your own 
experience, one of the main ways you find 
yourself silently—or openly—critiquing the 
comments of others? “Well, that doesn’t really 
support the original proposition.” There is 
probably no other way the casual comments 
of nonlawyers trying to prove a point are more 
different from lawyer’s comments than in 
their tendency to rely on irrelevancies. Of 
course, even lawyers are not immune. 
Someone in your organization, for example, 
put out the proposition that you needed an 
interesting and charismatic speaker. To which 
somebody responded, “I know a federal judge 
who will do it.” Which, as you can now see, 
is utterly irrelevant to the proposition.
 This ability to eliminate irrelevancies 
can be very useful in eliminating bias and 
prejudice. In a recent pleading, for example, 
in a Fair Labor Standards Act case, the plain-
tiff ’s lawyer made sure to mention that the 
defendant/company owner was a “Russian 
immigrant and convicted federal felon.” 
Credibility was not an issue in the early 
pleadings on class certification. It didn’t take 
long for his opponent to point out that the 
whole comment was completely irrelevant, 
and, in fact, completely improper.
 The lawyer’s efforts to eliminate irrel-
evancies and focus on what actually matters 
and to get juries to do the same can be a very 
laudable thing. It means that despite your 
immigration status, your criminal record, 
your race, your income, or your political 
affiliation, you have a shot at justice. So I 
commend to you the trait of eliminating 
irrelevancies.
The lawyer’s 
efforts to 
eliminate irrelevancies
and focus on 
what actually 
matters and to 
get juries to  
do the same 
can be a very 
laudable thing. 
It means that 
despite your 
immigra-
tion status, 
your criminal 
record, your 
race, your 
income, or 
your political 
affiliation, 
you have a shot at justice.
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 But at another level, law is an exercise 
in pragmatism, a glorified trade that for its 
operation depends on a host of assumptions 
that keep the day-to-day machinery of the 
law moving. I don’t mean this pejoratively. I 
loved practicing law, and it’s a great way to 
do a lot of good. But at the level of implemen-
tation and action, most lawyers are not very 
concerned with questions about whether we 
can even know what constitutes an external 
world. As the authors of Plato and a Platypus 
Walk into a Bar put it, “These are questions 
that are better examined over coffee and ciga-
rettes in a small Parisian cafe than over an 
assembly line in Detroit,” or for that matter, a 
box of documents in an associate’s office.
 We see these two types coexist in the 
legal world even today: the abstract legal 
theorist, usually a law professor, who under-
stands law as a branch of political philosophy 
and the no-nonsense lawyer entirely occupied 
with the work of individual clients and cases. 
Sometimes, as in Abraham Lincoln, we get 
both types in one lawyer. But not often.
 Most of you, I suspect, will be whole-
heartedly engaged in the business of law. But 
the philosophical tradition of questioning 
assumptions that you were mildly infected 
with in law school can still affect you in 
unhelpful ways. First, because you were 
introduced to skepticism but never really 
came to grips with it, you may become leery 
of declaratory statements. You have this ill-
defined notion that it’s hard to know any-
thing, or maybe just dangerous to make any 
claim to knowledge, so you constantly hedge 
your bets. This hedging is different than the 
spirit of liberty that Judge Hand described. 
Instead of care or even caution, it is coward-
ice. It seems premised on the idea that the 
law is built entirely on shifting sands, with 
no solid foundation, and the best a poor 
lawyer can do is avoid getting trapped in a 
categorical statement. I’m sure that for the 
new law student, or for the sloppy one, the 
central lesson of law school may seem to be 
that there are no rules and no right answers. 
But that’s stopping too soon, without pay-
ing the price for discerning the underlying 
solidity of law. The disillusionment of 1ls 
is supposed to “dis” only the “illusions,” not 
the whole. Professor Karl N. Llewellyn used 
a nursery rhyme to teach the process of first 
getting blinded by the law and then seeing 
again more clearly: 
s t r i c t  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  
n e u t r a l  r u l e s
In addition to focusing on 
the relevant, the law tends 
to reward and require the 
strict application of neutral 
rules. In my work, in particular, I 
am often called upon to determine the legally 
“correct” answer and then stop right there. 
I apply neutral rules, determine what result 
those rules dictate, and then in many cases 
my work is done. Maybe sea lions die, maybe 
a really nice person gets fired, or maybe a 
business loses the patent it needs to survive. 
Not always, but often, the law turns a blind 
eye to the consequences that may flow from 
the application of legal rules. 
 While this sounds like a grave weakness 
to some, it can be a significant strength in 
the application of the law. For example:
 When I am considering the fair and 
just sentence for a defendant, I will often 
receive the most heartrending letters from 
his family, even from his children, begging 
me not to send their son/husband/daddy to 
prison, or their lives will be ruined. What 
use do you think I ought to make of this 
information? I think the answer, at least in 
calculating the Sentencing Guidelines, is: 
very little. Or, to put it another way, how 
would you feel if you were the very next 
defendant being sentenced for the same 
conduct, and you didn’t happen to come 
from a lovely family who were good at 
writing letters? 
 There are all kinds of rules keeping out 
powerful, relevant evidence: confessions, 
smoking guns, fingerprints, dna, and the 
like. Many nonlawyers think the cost of 
these exclusions is always too high. I’m not 
here to defend them always, in all cases. But 
there is this strength: The exclusions hap-
pen according to neutral rules that operate 
in favor of the least popular group in society, 
and they get applied with some regularity 
even in the face of that unpopularity.
 So, we focus on proof and don’t make 
assumptions, we screen out irrelevancies, 
and we stick with the strict application of 
neutral rules. This helps us make more accu-
rate decisions, avoid bias and prejudice, and 
apply neutral rules in an evenhanded way—
all in all, not bad. Two cheers for thinking 
like a lawyer.
 But there are costs. Sometimes, those 
costs can be very high, even catastrophic. 
It’s worth thinking about the ways we think 
as lawyers that blind us to a better way. It’s 
worth examining these same basic traits for 
their doppelganger, their weaknesses.
a v o i d i n g  a s s u m p t i o n s : 
h a l f w a y  t h r o u g h  t h e 
b r a m b l e  b u s h
Let’s return to the trait 
of avoiding assumptions. 
Sometimes, not making 
assumptions isn’t the path to accuracy. 
Instead, it is the path to foolishness.
 Take, for example, the story of the 
sheared sheep. How many flocks of sheep 
in the universe are sheared on one side only? 
In the real world, the world in which people 
have to make decisions without perfect 
information, the answer is, not enough to 
matter.
 So if we are not careful, we can take this 
mental habit of challenging assumptions and 
carry it to the point where it does us great 
harm. If you will bear with me for a min-
ute, I want to put this habit of challenging 
assumptions—often born in law school—in 
a very simplified context.
 The broad trend of political philosophy, 
at least since the early modern philosophers, 
has been to re-examine the legitimacy of the 
state and its coercive power through binding 
law. I suppose this is simply part of the eter-
nal quest of philosophy to wonder about the 
nature of things, to ask, for example, how 
we can even know if we exist.
 I have the greatest respect for notable 
philosophers who have struggled with these 
difficult questions. The problem, as I see it, 
is that most of us only get a passing introduc-
tion to the philosophical method. They stare 
into the abyss; we blithely jump over a ravine. 
That’s just part of the overall schizophrenia 
of the law, which is really two things oper-
ating simultaneously. On one hand, at the 
level of abstraction, the law is an idea and is 
bound up in the whole question of who we 
are, what is society, and how, if ever, the law 
acquires coercive power. It is an offshoot of 
philosophy and is concerned with deeply 
serious and difficult questions about the 
nature of law and the state.
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still come to know things to be true. The law 
was once populated with a host of serious-
minded lawyers who understood this and 
struggled with it—now, not so much.
 My challenge to you is to do one of two 
things: either recognize that this whole phil-
osophical skepticism enterprise is just not 
your thing, back out of the bramble bush, 
and have at it in the business of the law; or 
finish the journey. Study, think hard, and 
rediscover a solid foundation for the law. It 
is the work of a lifetime.
 Llewellyn’s main point is one that some 
of you need to hear: just being blinded by 
the law, that is, abandoning all your prelaw 
assumptions and being willing to question 
the truth and reality of everything, is only 
half the journey. The rest of the journey is 
to carefully figure out what is real, true, sta-
ble, and reliable. You won’t learn this in law 
school. But you can learn it on your own 
through the dint of hard work. And even set-
ting aside for a moment your access to revela-
tion as a source of truth, you can, as lawyers, 
There was a man in our town
And he was wondrous wise:
He jumped into a bramble bush
And scratched out both his eyes—
And when he saw that he was blind, 
With all his might and main
He jumped into another one 
And scratched them in again.
[The Bramble Bush: On Our Law and Its Study 
(New York: Oceana Publications, 1951), 4]
Either recognize 
that this whole 
philosophical 
skepticism enter-
prise is just not 
your thing, back 
out of the bramble 
bush, and have at 
it in the business 
of the law; or fin-
ish the journey. 
Study, think hard, and rediscover 
a solid foundation for the law. 
It is the work of  
a lifetime.
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No doubt the ideal system, if it were attainable, 
would be a code at once so flexible and so minute, 
as to supply in advance for every conceivable situa-
tion the just and fitting rule. But life is too complex 
to bring the attainment of this ideal within the com-
pass of human powers. [The Nature of the Judicial 
Process (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1921), 143]
 I don’t mean to suggest that we dispense 
with all regulation. The certainty and clarity 
that some degree of regulation provides is 
essential to taking action. Before I go to the 
airport, for example, I don’t want to guess 
what I can take on the plane. But I think they 
can go ahead and quit explaining to me how 
to buckle a seat belt.
 We’ve all experienced the same thing—
some rigid bureaucrat applying a senseless 
regulation in ways that do some harm and no 
good.
 So I commended to you the beauty of 
neutral rules. But I hope you will think about 
the pervasive harm and lost liberty that can 
come from overregulation.
t h i n k i n g  l i k e  a  l aw y e r : 
h o w  t o  l o s e  f r i e n d s  a n d 
a l i e n at e  p e o p l e
So far I’ve looked at the 
strengths and weak-
nesses of three traits of 
thinking like a law-
yer. Now I want to 
step back and look 
at the phenomenon of thinking like a lawyer 
in terms of how it can ruin your life. 
 Rigorously analytical thinking is only 
a tool—and just one tool among many— 
for arriving at the truth. I should point out 
that being analytical has, in my experience, 
served the purposes of liars and self-deceivers 
almost as often as it has aided truth seekers. 
Please listen carefully, for we have come to 
the place in my remarks that represents the 
entire reason I have driven to Eugene. Your 
friends and families want you to hear this. 
Being illogical is not necessarily the same 
thing as being wrong. Or, to be more precise 
about it, stating your position or views in an 
illogical way is not the same thing as being 
wrong. I hope you caught the difference. 
Your friends and family know this, and they 
n e u t r a l  r u l e s :   
a  b r i d g e  t o o  fa r
The last trait I men-
tioned earlier was fol-
lowing neutral rules. I 
have tried to point out 
that following the same 
rules the same way for everybody is part 
of the genius of Western law. Now I’d like 
to look at the downside of rulemaking. 
For over a century, law has had an identity 
crisis about the certainty and neutrality 
of the rules of law. It started with the so-
called “realism” of Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes. In 1881, while still a law profes-
sor at Harvard, he suggested that the law 
was not, after all, neutral or certain but 
depended on the life experiences, views, 
and personal prejudices of judges and juries. 
“General propositions do not decide con-
crete cases,” he said, and more famously, 
“The life of the law has not been logic: it 
has been experience.” The more provoca-
tive description of this new realism was by 
Professor Robert Hutchins: “What a judge 
has for breakfast is more important than 
any principle of law.”
 The law—and lawyers—were both hor-
rified and fascinated by this new way of 
seeing things. To say there was an overreac-
tion is an understatement. To summarize a 
century of development: we took refuge in 
written rules. We decided that to avoid the 
idiosyncrasy and partiality of the broad but 
neutral rules, we would just have a written 
regulation that would clearly cover every-
thing and be basically self-executing. The 
law has generally turned away from heu-
ristic answers and now seeks algorithms. I 
hope you will agree with me that the idea 
that enough regulations can be written 
clearly enough so that the answer to every 
legal question is clear and requires no judg-
ment or debate has been a complete and 
total disaster.
 If I can make up my own distinction 
here: I believe in neutral, predictable rules 
that apply evenly to everyone but that are 
written at some level of generality. But I 
don’t believe in regulations that cover every 
aspect of life. Even if the enterprise were pos-
sible, it would vastly reduce liberty. And as 
Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo recognized, 
the whole idea is a mistake:
e l i m i nat i n g  
i r r e l e va n c i e s— 
b u t w h o s e?
The second trait 
I mentioned earlier 
was eliminating irrel-
evancies. It, too, has its dark side. We can 
mistakenly assume that analytic purity—
and by that I mean focusing only on facts or 
statements that tend to prove the proposi-
tion—is the best, or even the only, path to 
truth. In doing so, we can end up discarding 
other, equally valuable ways of figuring out 
what is real, or true, or correct. 
 For example, sometimes we focus on 
what a person is saying, testing it for its 
internal coherence, but don’t focus enough 
on who the speaker is. This was driven 
home to me in an experience I had during 
a summer clerkship. My firm was represent-
ing a bank whose customers had been swept 
up in a sprawling real estate scam. During 
the summer, I helped interview six or seven 
of those couples, who had lost everything. 
The scam involved the developer visiting 
people in their homes, trying to get them to 
take out a second mortgage and invest the 
money with him. He had the 1980s equiva-
lent of a PowerPoint presentation, and it 
was a beauty. All the numbers added up to 
support his promise of great returns, and it 
was backed up by high-profile endorsements 
and proven past performance. Of course, it 
was all a lie. After his show he’d gather up 
his materials and leave.
 Then the husband and wife would be 
alone. Six or seven times, I heard a tearful 
man who’d lost his life savings say some-
thing like this:
 I told her I thought it was a great opportu-
nity, and we should do it. She seemed very reluc-
tant. I asked why, and she couldn’t really give me 
a reason. She just said there was something about 
the guy that she didn’t trust. I told her that wasn’t 
really a valid reason, and so we went ahead. Boy, 
do I wish I had listened.
 I hope the point of this story is clear. 
Malcolm Gladwell, in his book Blink, makes 
the same point. There are ways of knowing 
that can’t be reduced to a structured argu-
ment. You ignore them at your peril.
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A solitude ten thousand fathoms deep
Sustains the bed on which we lie, my dear:
Although I love you, you will have to leap;
Our dream of safety has to disappear.
[W. H. Auden, “Leap Before You Look”]
3. Faith in God. My own view is that God 
is not illogical; in fact, He is the Author of 
logic. But He is possessed of vastly more 
truth and knowledge than we are. So He 
speaks in what seem like mortal ironies: Cast 
your bread upon the water, and it shall return 
to you; he that will lose his life shall find it; 
he that is greatest let him be the servant of 
all; if ye have done it unto the least of these, 
ye have done it unto me. Well, thinking like a 
lawyer simply won’t bring you the happiness 
and light found in these truths. But trust will. 
Faith will. A suspension of skepticism will.
 Still, this sort of faith and reason can 
coexist. I have always taken heart from the 
version of the Golden Rule found in Luke 
10:25–28 (see also Mark 12:32):
 And, behold, a certain lawyer stood up, and 
tempted him, saying, Master, what shall I do to 
inherit eternal life?
 He said unto him, What is written in the law? 
how readest thou?
 And he answering said, Thou shalt love the 
Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy 
soul, and with all thy strength, and with all thy 
mind; and thy neighbour as thyself. 
 And he said unto him, Thou hast answered 
right: this do, and thou shalt live. 
 As far as I know, this is the closest any 
lawyer has ever gotten to actually being 
praised by any major religious figure. But 
what he had done was worth praising: he had 
glimpsed the synthesis of the law and life.
c o n c l u s i o n
My assurance, my message to you is that 
if you will treat thinking like a lawyer as a 
brilliant and effective tool, but only a tool, 
with limits on its usefulness, and stay open 
to other tools for living your life, then your 
life as a lawyer—no, as a person with a law 
degree—can be satisfying and whole. 
*Michael W. Mossman, ’84, is a u.s. District Court 
Judge, District of Oregon.
Are they happier? More successful? Better 
parents or spouses? Better lovers? Are they 
even better politicians and legislators? The 
answer to each question is, of course, no. 
So maybe, just maybe, you still have a lot 
to learn from those around you, and you 
should pay attention.
f a i t h 
Finally, thinking like a lawyer can get in the 
way of living with faith. By that I mean faith 
with both a small and a capital F. I don’t 
mean to suggest that faith and reason are 
antithetical to each other. I see them as Venn 
diagrams, with substantial overlap. But most 
of the important endeavors in life require 
faith to act.
1. Faith to act. Let’s start with the business 
world. The most common complaint people 
in business have about lawyers is that they 
gum up deals and get in the way of making 
things happen. There is an element of risk, 
of the unknown, in most transactions, and 
many lawyers can’t seem to get over that. 
They obsess over what might go wrong or 
what cannot be known. Most ceos have to 
learn, at some level, to ignore their own law-
yers in order to succeed.
2. Faith in personal relationships. Of course, 
the same risk and uncertainty that exists in 
the business world exists to an even greater 
degree in personal relationships. The founda-
tion of every romance, every deep friendship, 
every family, is trust, faith, and perhaps a lit-
tle fear, but not logic, not counting the cost, 
not rigorous analysis.
The sense of danger must not disappear:
The way is certainly both short and steep,
However gradual it looks from here;
Look if you like, but you will have to leap.
.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
The worried efforts of the busy heap,
The dirt, the imprecision, and the beer
Produce a few smart wisecracks every year;
Laugh if you can, but you will have to leap.
.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .
get mad when you act like your orderly state-
ment of your position, coupled with your 
rhetorical skills, makes you right.
 You make this worse when you use a 
calm, rational demeanor and tone of voice 
as a weapon. Many of you have done this 
already. You have two false assumptions: 
first, that the person who speaks more ana-
lytically is right, and second, that the per-
son who speaks slowly and calmly is right. 
So, when you are arguing with a loved 
one or friend and you use calm speech as a 
weapon, knowing it will prod him or her to 
even greater emotionality, you have done 
doubly wrong. 
 Particularly in a family setting, there is 
another, perhaps more fundamental prob-
lem: you can actually be right and still be 
dead wrong. For example, if I have a dis-
cussion with my younger children, perhaps 
they will stake out some position that is, 
in fact, patently silly, readily demonstra-
ble as untrue and unwise. I might quickly 
show that in ways that are, for the sake of 
argument today, objectively irrefutable. 
Yet every word I speak in so doing will be 
deeply wrong.
 Why? Because in the name of getting 
the right answer on this issue, I am destroy-
ing the fragile bridge between me and her. 
Please work hard never to hear the words I 
have heard: “I can’t talk to you about things, 
Dad, because I just feel trapped by your 
arguments.”
 I mentioned earlier that one of the 
things we do is to note irrelevancies in the 
speech of others. My advice is: Don’t. Hear 
what is being said. Better yet, hear what is 
meant by what is said. I’ve heard lawyers in 
personal arguments say, “I’m just going by 
what you said,” as if that answered every-
thing. In a deposition, it might. But in life, 
go by what is meant in the context of who 
they are. Learn to hear in more than one lan-
guage, more than just the language of law. 
Initially, you may have to translate, but try 
to learn to seamlessly see the world through 
more than just the prism of the law. Right 
now you are immersed in the law. But soon, 
if you want to be happy, you must come 
up for air.
 This is really just about being hum-
ble. Trust me, most of us have a lot to be 
humble about. Ask yourself: Do lawyers 
generally live better lives than other people? 
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The following article is adapted from a talk given to the Orange County Chapter of J. Reuben Clark Law Society on April 8, 2011.
I most decidedly do not want
to sound like an ad campaign, however “We’ve come a long way, baby!” 
is about the best way I can think of to describe our current state of affairs 
when it comes to women in the law. The expression comes from the 
1960s ad campaign for cigarettes designed for women, with the idea at 
the time being that women had progressed so much in society that they 
now had cigarettes designed just for them. Of course, there are a number 
of ironies in the ad, the most obvious one being that by calling women 
“baby,” the campaign demonstrated just how far women still had to 
go. In much the same way, women in the law have indeed come a long 
way, but we see all around us examples of just how far we have left to go.
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the nana of three brilliant and capable 
granddaughters. Much like Thumper in the 
Disney classic Bambi, when it comes to my 
granddaughters, I am simply “twitterpated.” 
I have sentenced defendants to multiple life 
sentences. I have presided over more than 
30 horrific child molestation cases as well 
as many murder, attempted murder, sexual 
assault, gang, and domestic violence cases. 
I serve on committees, task forces, and 
judicial faculties at the county, state, and 
national levels. I am logical, forward think-
ing, in charge, and a bottom-line sort of 
person; but when it comes to my grand-
daughters, I am indeed twitterpated. Putty 
in their hands. I tried to get them to call me 
“Judge,” but they refused. Nana—of all the 
ridiculous things to be called—Nana. 
 I converted to the lds Church when I 
was 12 years old. A precocious child, when 
the missionaries knocked on my door, I read 
the entire Book of Mormon and decided to 
get baptized. My single mother and my two 
younger sisters joined some six years later. 
I am on my fourth tour of duty as Young 
Women president and have been honored to 
serve as Relief Society president as well. I am 
a card-carrying, temple-going, active mem-
ber of the lds Church, and I am the presid-
ing judge of one of the largest counties in 
the country—2.2 million people and 7,200 
square miles.
 Before becoming a judge, though, I was 
a commissioner. Before becoming a com-
missioner, I had my own law firm—a very 
successful firm, I might add. I represented 
regional banks, a large agricultural con-
glomerate, a car racing group, and many 
others, doing mostly business and real estate 
litigation. When I decided that I wanted to 
eventually become a bench officer, I devoted 
a portion of my practice to criminal defense 
 I’ll start by giving two examples of tre-
mendous women in the law who inspire me. 
Tani Cantil-Sakauye, our new chief justice 
of the California Supreme Court, is only 
the second female to hold this critical post 
within our legal system and the first Asian-
Filipina American to do so. She is amazing, 
intelligent, fair, and strong. She is 51 years 
old, a mother of two teenage daughters, and 
someone I know and admire greatly. 
 In my own appellate district, my dear 
friend Carol Codrington was just appointed 
this past January. She is the first African-
American to be appointed to our appel-
late district, and she is currently the only 
African-American woman on the court of 
appeals statewide. She is a dear friend, and 
I was privileged to speak at her confirma-
tion hearing held at the Supreme Court of 
California in San Francisco before then chief 
justice Ronald George, then attorney general 
(now governor) Jerry Brown, and the oth-
ers on the commission. I am proud of these 
women who are amazing and strong exam-
ples to me. They are part of a long chain of 
pioneers in the law that will undoubtedly 
continue into the future and one day include 
many who are just now entering or have yet 
to enter the profession.
 As for me, I am the mother of six chil-
dren—four daughters and two sons—and 
will share with you some 
of my thoughts about gender bias in the law, including examples of women who inspire 
me, anecdotes from my own legal career, obstacles I have faced along the way, and some 
thoughts about checking our own biases. I will leave with you the hope that I have for 
my own daughters, granddaughters, sons, and (one day) grandsons. We still have a 
long way to go, but I am indeed hopeful as I look forward and see us continuing toward 
the goals of equity feminism: fairness, equality, and access for all, regardless of gender.
I
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ing at me.  Finally, he spoke: “Well, Sherrill, 
guess you’ll be our lawyer. Guess we will fol-
low your advice.” He shook my hand and 
became one of my best clients. He owned 
a top-notch stock car and funny car rac-
ing business and hired me on to handle 
that business as well. Many an afternoon, 
I in my six-inch stilettos was in that garage, 
hanging with the guys and going over the 
contracts, signing them on the hood of a 
race car. They would hustle to flip over their 
pin-up calendars as a sign of respect, and I 
am certain their language was cleaned up as 
well. I retained and expanded their business 
because I was an excellent attorney who 
would not compromise her integrity or her 
gender. We are friends to this day. 
 In the mid-1990s, the statutory rape 
laws in the state of California were gender-
specific in that only men could be charged 
and only females could be protected. 
During that time, I had one of the most 
significant opportunities of my legal career. 
The football coach at a local high school 
made national attention by soliciting sex 
for his wife from two of his quarterbacks. 
He would bring the young men, both of 
whom, incidentally, were from strong and 
intact religious families, into his home and 
his life, making them part of the family. 
Then, as part of a very perverted plan, he 
strongly encouraged them to have sex with 
his wife. This went on for a few years until 
the story finally broke.
 Even though these young men were 
minors whose lives had been turned upside 
down, they were not protected under the 
statutory rape laws of California at the 
time, because they were male and the per-
son they were having sex with was female. 
The families of the victims came to me for 
help, and I took on their case, pro bono. 
With the help of these brave young men, 
I was able to start a grassroots campaign 
and help change the statutory rape laws in 
California to become gender neutral. Many 
other states followed our lead, and this is 
why we now see many female teachers, for 
example, prosecuted for having sex with 
their underage male students. 
 I lost a law partner as a result of that case 
and became the target of extreme gender 
bias, as did the young men. Jay Leno made 
jokes on national television discounting the 
notion that a teenage boy could be a victim. 
respond by behaving less zealously as advo-
cates and by acting in ways that are more 
dramatic and antic-driven in an attempt to 
compensate for gender bias.
 I decided rather early on that I would 
engender my gender. I brought a portable 
crib to my office and hired my mother as an 
office manager and nanny. The clients loved 
it, and I was able to keep my youngest at the 
office until I felt he was old enough to be 
in part-time day care. I would not become 
one of the boys, and I would not abandon 
the parts of womanhood that I enjoyed. 
My successes with juries would come from 
accentuating exactly who I was, without 
pretense. I was prepared, well spoken, and 
at ease. I wanted juries to see me as a woman, 
a mom, a sister, an aunt, and a daughter, 
because that is who I am. It did not require 
me to transgender my patterns of speech, my 
appearance, or my behavior. I did not have 
to be base or crude in order to be accepted. 
Indeed, I think that being a strong, compas-
sionate, intelligent woman is why I was so 
successful. Respect is garnered when respect 
is given without falsehood.
 Shortly after I began practicing law, 
an opportunity arose for me to take over a 
practice from an attorney who had practiced 
for years. He became a judge, and it was up 
to me to keep those longtime, important 
clients. The attorney’s parting words to me 
were, “Don’t blow it, young woman.” His 
biggest client was a very successful agricul-
tural business. These were farmers, men, 
manly men, men who ran a huge multimil-
lion dollar operation, and men who were 
wealthy and powerful enough that they were 
not used to being told no.
 I will never forget walking into the office 
of the ceo and owner of that business as a 
very young, female attorney, knowing that I 
was going to have to tell this gruff, grouchy, 
and powerful man something he did not 
want to hear. I was sick. I knew that this was 
make-or-break time. Keeping my integrity 
by giving my honest advice was, of course, 
most important, but I was well aware that 
if this business was pulled from me, my firm 
would go under. Before I went into that 
office, I did indeed feel like a little girl.
 I took a big breath, stood firm, and pre-
sented my advice, knowing it was contrary 
to what the farmer wanted. He listened, 
never interrupting me, and then sat glar-
through the county conflicts defense panel. 
As you can imagine, all of this went over well 
with some of the Relief Society women who 
knew better than me what was best for my 
family and my community.
 As a female lds attorney, you feel the 
sting of gender bias both in the professional 
world in which we circulate and, unfor-
tunately and more disappointingly, in the 
communities and cultures of our wards and 
stakes. I wish I could shift this over to the 
men, but I must say for the most part in my 
experience within the Church, it has been 
the women more than the men who have 
shown strong bias concerning the working 
woman. It seems that unless you are in the 
fields of education, nursing, or retail, you 
often become isolated as a result of strongly 
held preferences and biases by some of our 
sisters. An insightful bishop took care of 
that and made me Relief Society president. 
So on Sundays I made home visits, and on 
many a Monday I made jail visits. 
 Believe it or not, they were very much 
the same. I found that when people are in 
crisis, when people are hurting, they all need 
respect and compassion. Whether it is the 
single mother at church with tattoos and 
piercings who has lost her job and needs a 
food order or the young man caught up in 
the courts who has lost his way to drugs, 
they both need to be treated with dignity, 
even if that dignity results in consequences 
for their choices. When sentencing the cruel-
est of criminals, I try to do so with decorum, 
never demeaning or losing sight of the integ-
rity of the office I hold so dear. 
 As a litigator, I had many experiences 
that I’m sure countless others have had: I 
was often mistaken for the court reporter 
or clerk, called “Miss” instead of “Ms.,” or, 
worse yet, “hun” or “young lady.” These seem 
like small things, but the cumulative effect 
is annoying, to say the least, and serves as 
one more distraction in a high-stress situ-
ation. It also does something strange to 
women. Rather than command respect 
based on our performance and our gender, 
we do odd things in response, like lower our 
voices when speaking in court, talking in our 
female version of a manly man voice. Why 
do some women lawyers do that with their 
voices, anyway? I think it confuses juries, 
and I know it confuses me. It is rather odd, 
but we do it. More significantly, we often 
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ing judge. In its more than one hundred year 
history, I was only the seventh woman ever 
appointed to the Riverside County Superior 
Court and only the second woman appointed 
to my current position of presiding judge.
 Recently, this topic of gender bias got 
me searching. I felt a little bit like a kid 
who is snipe hunting—looking for but 
never finding the illusive snipe. In this case 
I was searching for a female lds judge in 
California other than myself. I called the 
Church offices, which sent me to the statis-
tics department, which sent me to the legal 
department, which sent me to a real law 
firm with a name like McConkie in it. That 
resulted in someone doing some research 
and calling back with the simple answer “We 
don’t know the answer.” I called all of my 
male lds judges from the trial court to the 
court of appeals, up and down the state. The 
universal conclusion was “Never heard of 
one; don’t think they exist.”
 So I would love to be corrected, but 
I think I am on fairly good, elevated bur-
den of proof standards when I say that I 
 Nevertheless, I was given the opportu-
nity to serve in a similar capacity as a com-
missioner. I held that post for nine years. I 
loved it but knew I wanted more. Year after 
year the judges, commissioners, and attor-
neys with whom I interacted encouraged me 
to apply for a judgeship. I knew I wanted to, 
but I didn’t want to go through that miser-
able experience again. After nine years I 
finally put my name back into the hat. This 
time around it was a much better experience. 
My jne interview took 20 minutes, and my 
evaluators told me they had not received a 
single negative evaluation. A far cry from 
those who had questioned me as a woman, 
mother, and Mormon, the evaluators this 
time around focused on attributes like fair-
ness, integrity, and legal acumen.
 Being sworn in as a superior court judge 
was for me a defining moment in my life. Not 
only did it give me a little taste of sweet vindi-
cation, as you can imagine, but it also allowed 
me to honor my mother, my sisters, my hus-
band, and my children. I was subsequently 
elected by my peers to the office of presid-
In court, male attorneys and judges made 
crude and inappropriate remarks. Shock 
jocks and others on the radio used this as 
fodder, questioning my relationship with 
these boys as a female attorney about the 
same age as their perpetrator. Some femi-
nists jeered me as well, go figure, claiming 
that the change in the law would open up 
additional ways to oppress women. It was a 
difficult time, but it was a victorious time. 
It was the right thing to do. We testified in 
Sacramento, and the law was passed. Those 
young men did something courageous as 
they stepped out of the shadows, and I am 
proud to have helped them. 
 Shortly after that, I decided to apply to 
become a judge. I was a shoo-in—at least 
that’s what everyone thought. I went into 
my judicial nomination evaluation (jne) 
interview confident and collected. Two of 
my interviewers were women, so I knew 
that gender bias wouldn’t be an issue, of 
course, and thought to myself, “I have 
this made, sisters!” At 35, I was young and 
far more naïve, I suppose, than I had ever 
imagined. The experience could not have 
been much worse. Most jne interviews 
last between 30 and 90 minutes. The first 
few minutes were great as we ran through 
my strengths. Then it got ugly. For the 
next several hours I was grilled on being a 
Mormon and, more extensively and spe-
cifically, on how I could possibly be a judge 
and a mother with all those children. When 
I left, I was battered and bruised and pretty 
dumbfounded. It was no surprise that I 
didn’t get the job. Despite my previous suc-
cesses, and although I knew I was only one 
of a hundred applicants, not getting the 
position really made me think that I simply 
might not be judge material.
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in your lives to continue to learn, to serve, 
and to define themselves.
 So what hope do we have for the future? 
I am very hopeful. There are 58 presiding 
judges in California. It is truly the highest 
honor that can be bestowed on trial court 
judges to be asked by their peers to lead and 
represent them. Of the 58 presiding judges, 
we have, I believe, a record 13 female presid-
ing judges, and Los Angeles has its first-ever 
female presiding judge. I see more female 
attorneys in court all the time and wide-scale 
acceptance of attorneys on their merits, not 
their gender. 
 Over the past 15 years in my combined 
time as a commissioner and a judge, I have 
had many amazing experiences and signifi-
cant accomplishments. I believe my success 
is in some ways a direct reflection of the 
obstacles I overcame as a woman—an lds 
woman—along the way. Perhaps I com-
mitted a little bit more as I felt the need 
to overcome the bias—being considered 
a young lady instead of a lawyer, a court 
reporter instead of a litigator, or a soccer 
mom only instead of a judicial candidate. 
Despite the frustrations and the obstacles 
along the way, I have often thought, “Who 
better than me, a mother of six, to sort out 
the complex issues of high-conflict cus-
tody battles? Who better than me, an lds 
woman, to preside over child molestation 
cases where the victims and the juries need 
a gentle touch? Who better than me to han-
dle domestic violence cases?” 
 I am confident that we will one day see 
true fairness, equality, and access for all, 
regardless of gender. To get there, though, 
each of us needs to step up and ask, “Who 
better than me?” I am convinced that the 
best ways to combat the biases we face are 
to perform to the best of our abilities, to 
be committed to excellence in all aspects of 
our profession, and to embrace the gospel 
in a way that never leaves others to ques-
tion our standards. Although we see less 
bias today than in decades past, I am confi-
dent that we will only continue to progress. 
One day we will look back on our present 
times and the progress we will have made 
from now, thinking to ourselves, “We’ve 
come a long way, baby.”
*Sherrill Anne Ellsworth is presiding judge, Riverside 
County Superior Court.
think I am the only female lds judge in 
the state of California. I am certain that 
I am the only female lds presiding judge 
in the state of California. It is a little star-
tling, isn’t it? If anyone knows of other 
California snipes such as me, I welcome 
your e-mails of correction.
 As women, we need to do all we can 
to combat bias in appropriate ways. When 
my youngest was in his senior year of high 
school, he lettered in three sports. I was in 
a plum assignment presiding over felony 
trials with the most experienced lawyers, 
the most interesting cases, and a beautiful 
top-floor office at one of the newer court-
houses. But I had a 45-minute commute 
that precluded me from watching him play 
baseball. As a mom, I wanted to be there; 
as a judge who did not want to look weak, 
I was torn. In the end, I traded in the plum 
for a difficult domestic violence family law 
assignment in order to be closer to home 
and able to attend his games. I am a mom 
who happens to be a judge, and compro-
mising my priorities would have been a 
compromise of who I am. I gained the 
respect of both men and women on the 
bench because my family came first. We 
as women often tend to be our own worst 
enemies; we like to blame the guys, but we 
are frequently just as culpable, if not worse. 
Women, figure out what your priorities are, 
and do not compromise or yield to bias or 
pressure. You will be less stressed, and you 
will find that those who are important to 
you will respect your decisions. 
 To the wonderful men who support 
the women in their lives, as my husband 
and sons have supported me, I thank 
you. I ask you to continue to check your 
biases and consider how you deal with the 
women in your life. I hope you encourage 
your daughters to be what I refer to in my 
Young Women organization as “ultimate 
women.” Ultimate women are those who 
rely on their inner beauty, who are intelli-
gent, who are strong, and who are coura-
geous. I love that my niece, the same niece 
who was a beauty pageant finalist, a vocal-
ist, and a viola player, graduated from byu 
with an advanced degree in mathematics 
despite being told “girls don’t like math” 
over and over by her peers, teachers, and 
leaders. She is a great example to me of 
an ultimate woman. Encourage the women 
I am confident 
that we will one 
day see true fair-
ness, equality, 
and access for all, 
regardless of gen-
der. To get there, 
though, each of us 
needs to step up 
and ask, “Who bet-
ter than me?”
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and most states followed suit.7 In 1944, Rule 46 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
allowed courts to consider several factors in setting bail, including “the nature and circum-
stances of the offense charged, the weight of the evidence against him, the financial ability of 
the defendant to give bail and the character of the defendant.”8 While it did not consider whether 
the defendant posed a threat while released, the ability of judges to consider the “character of 
the defendant” provided an opening to evaluate a defendant’s dangerousness.
 As time went on, bail reform continued to expand upon the reasoning for which 
defendants could be detained pretrial. The 1966 Bail Reform Act focused on a defendant’s 
appearance in court, permitting judges to consider a defendant’s prior record9 and thus 
opening the door for judges to consider additional factors besides flight risk.10 Under the 
District of Columbia Crime Bill of 1970,11 judges, for the first time in u.s. history, could 
detain a defendant pretrial, without setting any bail, if the defendant was deemed danger-
ous to society.12
 Taking a cue from the d.c. Crime Bill and a greater public fear of crime, the Federal Bail 
Reform Act of 198413 took a leap towards preventative detention, focusing on protecting the 
public from danger.14 The act was soon challenged in court, but it withstood constitutional 
challenges of vagueness, violation of right to bail, presumption of innocence, due process, 
and excessive bail.15
 Before the Bail Reform Act of 1984, various states had passed legislation allowing judges 
to consider in making bail determinations the danger that defendants posed to the commu-
nity.16 Some state laws generally listed criteria to consider when making bail decisions (such 
as community ties, employment status, financial resources, drug addictions, etc.); however, 
judges were free to ignore these criteria and focus solely on the criminal charge and the prior 
criminal record of the defendant.17 Because dangerousness was not clearly defined, there were 
no “precise legal standards” that judges were required to follow, and determining dangerous-
ness varied greatly by state.18
 Often, state courts evaluate three main categories to determine dangerousness: (1) the pres-
ent offense charged, (2) past conduct, and (3) judicial discretion of the accused’s circumstances 
and character. To objectively determine dangerousness, the present offense charged often trig-
gers dangerousness assessments based upon the nature of the crime. Many states review the 
defendant’s criminal record and record of appearances to evaluate dangerousness. The most sub-
jective factor that courts consider when determining dangerousness is the defendant’s character. 
    udges considering the “danger” posed by a defendant in pretrial release is a relatively 
new phenomenon. Historically, most defendants were guaranteed release on bail before 
trial.1 The major factor to determine pretrial release used to be whether a defendant posed 
a flight risk. However, after the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984, judges were charged with 
determining which defendants were “dangerous” or posed a threat to public safety, allow-
ing judges to hold particular defendants in jail pretrial. Across the nation judges began pre-
dicting which defendants would be likely to commit a violent crime. Much debate ensued 
on whether that determination was appropriate, as well as which factors should be taken 
into consideration. However, the debate died more than 20 years ago, and there has been 
little dialogue since on how pretrial detention is going for America. Today, politicians are 
searching for a solution to the rising costs of incarceration in tough economic times; how-
ever, pretrial detention’s impact on high incarceration rates has yet to enter the discussion.2
 Our analysis of a nationally representative 
15-year dataset of over 100,000 defendants 
shows that the United States could signifi-
cantly reduce the amount of people held in 
jail pretrial. These data show that currently 
judges often detain the wrong people. We 
also demonstrate that up to 25 percent more 
defendants could be released pretrial without 
an increase in pretrial crime. As many coun-
ties in the United States spend more money 
on jails than on schools,3 changes to pretrial 
detention could have sweeping public policy 
effects, especially since the majority of people 
in u.s. jails are pretrial defendants.4 If pretrial 
detention can be reduced and more defen-
dants can be safely released without increas-
ing crime, more defendants would have 
access to pretrial liberty and due process, 
counties would save substantial amounts 
of money on corrections that could be put 
toward other important social goals, and the 
public would continue to feel safe at home.
History of American Pretrial Prediction
 Under the common law, due process 
and the presumption of innocence guaran-
teed defendants the right to bail before trial.5 
u.s. federal law required bail to be presumed 
for everyone but murder defendants (where 
significant proof of the alleged crime was 
present).6 Until 1944, federal law guaran-
teed bail for all noncapital federal offenses, 
J
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ors were better predictors. However, prob-
lems with its sample size limit the study’s 
informative value.36
 Goldkamp’s Philadelphia Bail Study in 
the late 1970s found that detained pretrial 
defendants were much more likely to be incar-
cerated after conviction or pleading guilty 
than those who were released pretrial.37
 Studies in the 1980s indicated that most 
defendants appeared at trial. However, rear-
rest rates were quite high, between 10 and 20 
percent, thus failing to convince policy mak-
ers to reduce pretrial detention.38
 Since the 1980s, few studies regard-
ing pretrial detention have been done. A 
study conducted in New York, where dan-
gerousness cannot be a determinant fac-
tor of preventive detention, showed that 
few defendants were rearrested for violent 
crimes while on pretrial release.39 The study 
determined that residing at a New York 
City address, having a residential telephone, 
being employed, being in school, or partici-
pating in a training program full-time were 
all factors that related significantly to a low 
risk of pretrial misconduct.40
 These studies illustrate the difficulty 
of accurately predicting pretrial crime. 
Scholars disagree as to (1) whether judges 
should rely on the initial charge to set bail,41, 
42 (2) what the crime rate is for defendants 
released pretrial,43, 44 and (3) whether past 
criminal behavior is an accurate predictor 
of future criminal conduct.45, 46 Some have 
said that a previous failure to appear has an 
indication on future failures to appear or an 
impact on predicting future crimes.47 Also, 
as far as age and gender, all of those who 
have commented on this have noted that 
younger male defendants are more likely 
to commit pretrial crime than older female 
defendants.48 Finally, many scholars have 
lamented that determinations of bail and 
predictors of pretrial crime can never be 
effective or accurate.49
Pretrial Crime Dataset
 Our national dataset is based on a nationally representative sample covering the 75 largest 
counties in the United States. The data are drawn from the Bureau of Justice’s State Court 
Processing Statistics from 1990 to 2006 and include over 116,000 observations.50 Each obser-
vation records what happens to a given felony defendant from the time of their arrest through 
their trial. The data contain information on the initial crime committed, any subsequent bail 
crime, the defendant’s prior record, any failures to appear, and demographic characteristics 
such as age, gender, and race.
This could include (1) the accused’s family sit-
uation, (2) employment, (3) finances, (4) char-
acter and reputation, (5) record of appearances 
or history of flight, (6) community ties,19 (7) 
alien status,20 (8) gang involvement,21 (9) pos-
session or control of weapons,22 (10) propen-
sity for violence,23 (11) general attitude and 
demeanor,24 (12) history of depression,25 (13) 
treatment of animals,26 and (14) “any other 
factor” relevant to making a determination of 
dangerousness.27 A defendant found to pose 
a danger to the public will either be detained 
pretrial or released subject to restrictive condi-
tions that are the “least restrictive” conditions 
to ensure the defendant’s appearance and pro-
tect the community.28
Past Studies on Predictions of Violence
 A number of studies have been performed 
over the last 50 years in order to examine vari-
ous bail systems, pretrial detention, and pre-
diction of pretrial crime. While informative, 
many are limited in scope and outdated.
 Foote’s Philadelphia Bail Study in 1954 
found that judges based pretrial detention 
on the charge because it was an easy stan-
dard to apply,29 despite the fact that those 
with lesser offenses were less likely to appear 
in court than defendants with more serious 
criminal charges.30
 The National Bureau of Standards Study 
in 1969 found that the instances of crimi-
nal defendants committing serious felonies 
pretrial were low, contradicting claims by 
advocates of preventive detention.31 The 
study concluded that there was no statisti-
cal relationship between the first arrest type 
of crime and the second arrest crime. It also 
asserted that none of the 10 characteristics 
used in the District of Columbia’s Bill were 
accurate predictors.32
 A 1970 Los Angeles study concluded that 
defendants are rarely arrested for new crimes 
on pretrial release.33 This study agreed with 
the nbs study, concluding that those released 
pretrial are not very likely to be rearrested.
 A Harvard study conducted in 1970 
confirmed the nbs study’s findings on pre-
trial detention,34 concluding that the initial 
charge is a poor indicator of recidivism.35 
The study determined that juvenile arrests, 
previous incarceration, conviction of violent 
or dangerous crimes within the past 10 years, 
and convictions of four or more misdemean-
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 Our dataset allows us to overcome two types of selectivity bias inherent to pretrial risk 
assessment. First, because the sample size is large and many jurisdictions use different deter-
minations for detaining or releasing defendants, we can predict how dangerousness differs 
between those commonly—but not always—held and those commonly released. Second, 
many defendants are released based upon a number of conditions that may make them less 
likely to commit crime. However, knowing a defendant’s crime risk under no restrictions is 
not pertinent if the most common way defendants are released is with restrictions.51
 Overall, there is a relatively low level of arrests pretrial. Of all of the defendants released, 
only 16 percent of them are rearrested for any reason, while 11 percent are rearrested for a fel-
ony and 1.9 percent are rearrested for a violent felony.
 In 43 states judges consider the defendant’s present charge in determining release.52 Prior 
studies have found that judges often rely on the initial charge to set bail,53 though some stud-
ies have concluded that the crime charged is unrelated to the crime the defendant is rearrested 
for on release.54 Our large sample allows us to draw a much cleaner inference than found in 
previous studies.
 While the Harvard study and others claimed that there was little information in the ini-
tial charge, this turns out to be untrue. For example, those with an initial murder charge are 
more than 20 times more likely to be rearrested on a violent felony charge than a defendant 
charged with fraud (0.3 percent v. 6.4 percent) and about six times more likely than someone 
arrested on a drug possession charge (1.1 percent v. 6.4 percent).
 Defendants charged with violent crimes are not necessarily more 
likely to be rearrested pretrial. The defendants with the highest rearrest 
rates pretrial (21 percent) are those charged with drug sales and robbery. 
Those released who are charged with the more “dangerous crimes,” such as murder, rape, 
and felony assault, have much lower overall rates of pretrial rearrest at 12 percent, 9 percent, 
and 12 percent. However, those originally charged with violent crimes are much more likely 
to be rearrested pretrial for violent crimes, showing that the initial charge is linked with the 
type of crimes committed pretrial.
 While there is a large range of “dangerousness” pretrial, those released pretrial are perhaps 
much less dangerous than most people would anticipate. For almost all crimes,55 defendants 
are only about 1–2 percent likely to be arrested for a violent crime pretrial.
 Thirty-three states and the District of Columbia conduct some review of the defen-
dant’s prior convictions as a factor in pretrial release. However, prior work has disagreed as 
to whether past conduct56 or previous convictions are accurate predictors of future criminal 
conduct.57 This more extensive dataset analysis indicates that past crime is a key predictor of 
future crime. Though there is a correlation between prior convictions and rearrest, the data 
show that defendants with four or more prior convictions are not rearrested much more than 
defendants with no or just one prior conviction. Repeat offenders, those with four prior con-
victions, are still only committing pretrial violent crime in about one in 30 instances. A person 
with prior convictions appears to be more dangerous than a person with prior arrests, yet both 
categories of defendants are more likely to commit violent crimes pretrial.
 Age is also a strong predictor of future arrests. The older the defendant, the less likely 
the defendant will be rearrested. Teenagers are four times more likely to be rearrested than a 
defendant over the age of 50. Along with age, both prior record and initial charge make sub-
stantial differences in the probability of rearrest. On the other hand, prior failures to appear 
are not significant predictors of future violent behavior.
 Judges detain defendants pretrial not only on the basis of dangerousness but also on flight 
risk. Flight risk varies somewhat with age, but the difference is not as pronounced as it was for 
violence risk. A prior failure to appear more than doubles the chance of flight. This is significant 
because historically courts looked primarily at flight risk to determine whether to release an indi-
vidual on bail. Initial offense is also a strong predictor, but in a very different pattern compared to 
violent crime. For violent crime, an initial violent crime charge indicated the highest chances of 
rearrest for violence; but for flight risk, those most likely to flee are those accused of drug crimes.
 In general, the factors that a judge can easily observe about a defendant that make him 
more likely to flee are almost completely uncorrelated (and thus unrelated) to the factors that 
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make a defendant likely to be rearrested for a violent crime. This is not to say that the 
two events are entirely uncorrelated but rather that the things one can predict about 
future crime are uncorrelated with the things one can predict about flight risk.
 In states that consider both flight risk and dangerousness, which constitute the 
majority of states, dangerousness seems to be a much larger consideration for judges. 
A one-unit log increase in flight risk increases the chances of being held by about 2 
percent, while a similar increase in predicted violence leads to a 10 percent increase 
in likelihood of detention. Thus, potential for violence is considered almost five times 
more heavily than flight risk in most states.
 In the states that do not consider dan-
gerousness or that ban preventative deten-
tion, flight risk becomes dramatically more 
important. A one-unit log change in flight 
risk produces an increase of 9.9 percent in 
the chances of being held, while a similar 
increase in predicted violence increases the 
chances of being held by 8 percent. Thus, 
while these states may not be following the 
law perfectly, flight risk is a bigger consider-
ation than expected danger.
 Since the 1980s both federal and state 
detention rates have increased. Over the last 
two decades local jails have housed more 
pretrial detainees than actual convicts.58 
Based upon the dataset and current pre-
trial detention practices, judges are often 
releasing and detaining the wrong groups 
of people. The data suggest that about half 
of those detained are less likely to commit 
a violent crime pretrial than many of the 
people released. The percentage of pretrial 
defendants released could be increased from 
its current 62 percent to 85 percent while 
maintaining a crime rate of 14.7 percent, 
which is lower than the current rate of 16 per-
cent. Thus, our predicted model can provide 
guidance for judges to make more efficient 
decisions and increase the number of people 
released pretrial without causing increased 
danger to the public.
 Beyond just reducing the prison popu-
lation, more accurately predicting rearrest 
rates would have a great impact on defen-
dants. Often defendants who are detained 
pretrial suffer prejudice, being more likely 
to be convicted or plead guilty.59 Beyond 
the likelihood of guilt, defendants detained 
pretrial often encounter difficulty in financial and employment pursuits,60 in obtaining 
private counsel,61 and in sentencing.62 In addition, increased detention increases costs for 
counties, which are dealing with tight budgets.
 We do not ignore that there are large costs to victims and society when more crimes are 
committed. The costs of murder, rape, burglary, robbery, and other felony offenses are tre-
mendous financially and in other intangible ways.63 The aims of detaining defendants pretrial 
have evolved in order to protect society from repeating events that brought the defendants to 
court in the first instance.
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Conclusion
 In our society today we expect the gov-
ernment to provide for our safety by prevent-
ing crime and violence and often criticize the 
criminal justice system and its inefficiencies. 
Others tackling the pretrial crime and predic-
tion problem have advocated speedy trials,64 
an increase in pretrial supervision programs,65 
bail forfeiture,66 more visibility of judi-
cial detention decisions,67 and setting bail 
amounts in a more logical way.68 While our 
model is not the end-all to solving the prob-
lem, accurately predicting pretrial violent 
crime contributes in several important ways.
 First, this expansive dataset and study 
show that pretrial crime is actually quite 
unlikely. Looking specifically at some of the 
most dangerous felony defendants, the data 
show that only 1.9 percent are rearrested for 
violent felony crime. To look at it another 
way, about 80 percent of released pretrial 
defendants have less than a 3 percent chance 
of being arrested pretrial for a violent crime. 
Overall, the average rearrest rates are only 
about 1–2 percent for a violent pretrial crime.
 Second, while most defendants released 
pretrial do not commit violent felonies, 
there are several factors that judges should 
consider in order to more accurately predict 
the likelihood of pretrial crime. The present 
offense, prior convictions, and prior fail-
ure to appear are all important predictors 
of pretrial rearrest. Regarding the present 
offense charged, those charged with rob-
bery, burglary, and motor vehicle theft are 
more likely than the average defendant to be 
rearrested for any crime on release. While 
defendants charged with drug offenses were 
thought to be dangerous, they are among 
the least likely to be rearrested for a violent 
crime. The data also show that prior con-
victions are directly correlated with future 
likelihood to commit crime. Although pre-
trial crime is generally exaggerated, defen-
dants with prior convictions are more likely 
to commit pretrial crime—about one in 30 
instances. As for failing to appear in a prior 
court proceeding, it is a good predictor for 
being a flight risk but not a good predictor 
of pretrial violent crime. However, past fail-
ure to appear is an indicator for being rear-
rested for a nonviolent crime.
 Third, based upon these factors, judges 
often weigh the dangerousness of a defendant 
much more heavily than flight risk. However, 
if the state is not permitted to consider danger-
ousness, flight risk is a bigger consideration.
 Finally, while recognizing the overall 
increase in detention rates, this study shows 
that if the goal is to prevent crime, judges are 
releasing and detaining the wrong groups. 
About half of those detained have less chance 
of being rearrested pretrial than many of the 
people released. We would be able to release 
25 percent more defendants while decreasing 
pretrial crime levels if we released defendants 
using our evidence-based model. This model 
demonstrates that judges may safely release 
some older defendants, people with clean 
prior records, and people who commit fraud 
and public order violations without increas-
ing danger to the public.
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after 25 years of service
Nancy Stevenson Van Slooten, ’83, interna-tional chair of the  
J. Reuben Clark Law Society, 
never even thought about 
attending law school. She was 
in the byu accounting program 
intent on joining the mba pro-
gram after returning from her 
mission. One of her accounting 
professors suggested law school, 
so Nancy called Reese Hansen, 
then dean over admissions, 
who encouraged her to apply. 
He touted law school over busi-
ness school: “A lawyer with an 
accounting degree can do what 
an mba does, but an mba can’t 
do what a lawyer does.” He 
also said that women should be 
lawyers and doctors rather than 
nurses and secretaries because 
“they set the work schedules and 
can earn more money with less 
time away from the family.” She 
was accepted to both programs 
but chose law school.
 Amid the stresses of her first 
year she was called to be Relief 
Society president in her student 
ward, where she learned to bal-
ance the needs of the sisters with 
her rigorous law school sched-
ule. The blessings came after she 
graduated and was hired at a Los 
Angeles firm, where she took 
over the retiring senior partner’s 
practice on a four-year partner-
ship track. In the first interview 
Nancy stated her priorities for 
balancing professional life with 
family life. She became the only 
woman and non-Catholic attor-
ney in the firm. The firm later 
allowed her to work three days 
a week at the law firm and three 
days a week at a cpa firm when 
she decided to pursue her cpa.
 In 1986 Nancy was invited 
to Provo to meet with Law 
School officials and other lds 
attorneys about beginning a 
professional organization. In 
1987 the J. Reuben Clark Law 
Society was formed. Nancy 
joined the charter national 
board of the Law Society along 
with 16 others. John Welch, Sr., 
a board member and a senior 
partner at Latham & Watkins in 
Los Angeles, became the chair 
of the Los Angeles Chapter of 
the Law Society, with Nancy as 
his assistant.
 Nancy began volunteer-
ing in the Law Society when 
she was single and practicing 
law and has continued to serve 
throughout her courtship and 
marriage and while raising 
children. She and her husband 
adopted three children from 
Russia, two from Ukraine, 
and one from California. After 
bringing the two babies home 
from Russia, she resigned from 
her firm partnership and began 
part-time work—15 hours a week 
with one day each week in the 
office—fulfilling Dean Hansen’s 
assertion that lawyers set their 
own schedules.
 Nancy was the chair of the 
Los Angeles Chapter when 
her family moved to Georgia. 
She then became part of the 
Law Society’s International 
Board, where she promoted 
chapter events, assisted in the 
compilation of the Law Society 
handbook, and helped set up 
committees.
 In 2001 Bill Atkin, then 
international chair, asked Nancy 
to set up the new international 
student chapters. In just six 
years there were 75. Serving as 
the chair-elect of the executive 
committee in 2007, she became 
the international chair in 2009 
and will complete her term in 
October 2011.
 Through her work with 
the student chapters, Nancy 
has developed a deep love for 
the students and for mentor-
ing them. As an entering law 
student Nancy had a chance 
encounter with an lds attorney 
on a bus in Los Angeles. He 
invited her to his office and told 
her some of his experiences of 
negotiating the analytical and 
skeptical attorney traits in his 
professional life with being 
teachable and open to the 
Spirit. Nancy felt blessed by 
that encounter and looks with 
satisfaction at similar mentoring 
opportunities between students 
and attorney mentors affiliated 
with the Law Society. 
 As the first female interna-
tional chair of the Law Society, 
Nancy is no stranger to having 
to stand up to be heard. Her law 
school class was composed of 
only 10 percent women, and she 
was the first woman partner at 
her law firm. From her early years 
in practice she tells this story: “I 
had been appearing before the 
same judge in the probate court 
for many years (he was known 
not to approve of women attor-
neys, but I knew he respected 
me anyway), presenting myself 
by saying, ‘Good morning, your 
honor. Nancy Stevenson appear-
ing for the petitioner.’ The first 
court appearance after my mar-
riage I presented myself by say-
ing, ‘Good morning, your honor. 
Nancy Van Slooten appearing 
for the petitioner.’ The judge 
stopped the court and asked, 
‘Did I hear a new name? Are 
congratulations in store?’ I said, 
‘Yes, your honor, I recently got 
married.’ He responded, ‘And 
he still lets you work?’ I respect-
fully replied, ‘Yes, your honor, 
and I still let him work.’ The 
judge’s female clerk stood and 
applauded.”
 In reflecting on her time 
as international chair, Nancy 
points to important accomplish-
ments. “We have worked to 
streamline the efficiency of the 
Law Society so that it is ready 
for future international growth,” 
she says. “We have encouraged 
our members to be an influence 
for good, be a part of their com-
munities, and be leaders in their 
communities. As people hear 
about the Law Society, we hope 
that the members will be known 
as good people who stand for 
good things.” Nancy doesn’t 
think that describing the work 
of the Law Society as “saving 
souls” is a stretch. “One mission 
of the Law Society is buoying 
each other up spiritually—reach-
ing out to other attorneys, con-
necting with them, and not just 
standing by as they flounder.”
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always  learning
After 20 years in the     workplace, Tani Pack       Downing, ’91, presi-
dent of the byu Law School 
Alumni Association, is surprised 
when she is the only woman in 
the room. It used to be the rule, 
but things have changed a little. 
“People sometimes did not know 
I was a woman until they met 
me,” she says. “I guess because of 
my name.” Tani remembers an 
experience from working at her 
first law firm: “We had a deposi-
tion scheduled, and when the 
opposing attorney, who was a 
man, showed up, he asked me if 
I was the court reporter. When 
I told him who I was, he seemed 
surprised. He had been expect-
ing a man.”
 There were only a couple of 
women attorneys in the first two 
firms Tani worked in. When she 
began working for state govern-
ment, closer to half of the attor-
neys working for the legislature 
were women.
 This is a change from when 
Tani was growing up. Her best 
friend’s mother was the only 
woman she was acquainted 
with who worked outside the 
home—as a high school teacher. 
“She always had piles of books at 
the side of her chair or bed,” Tani 
recalls. “I was inspired by her. 
Not only did I prepare myself for 
a profession—going to college 
like she encouraged me to do—
there are 30 books now stacked 
at the side of my bed. There are 
biographies, historical works, 
and Church books. I want to 
always be learning.”
 Tani says her career path 
has been nothing she could ever 
have scripted. Her first job was 
as an associate with Alverson, 
Taylor, Mortensen & Nelson 
in Las Vegas. Her husband was 
a Marine, and when his next 
assignment came as a posting in 
Hawaii, she found a job with a 
law firm in Honolulu. At the end 
of her husband’s service the fam-
ily moved to Utah, where Tani 
was hired as an associate general 
counsel to the Utah legislature. 
Seven years later she began in-
house work at an up-and-com-
ing high-tech firm, but when 
the tech bubble burst, Tani was 
part of the layoffs. She was sub-
sequently hired as the general 
counsel and director of appeals 
for the Utah Department of 
Workforce Services. After 
Governor Huntsman was 
elected, he appointed her as its 
executive director. A few years 
later the governor appointed her 
to be his deputy chief of staff and 
general counsel in the governor’s 
office. The job demanded 60 to 
70 hours per week, and she was 
always on call. After Huntsman 
was appointed ambassador to 
China, she heard about a posi-
tion for state risk manager and 
asked for Governor Herbert’s 
blessing to move into that posi-
tion so that she could spend 
more time with her family. She 
has been working there since 
August 2009.
 Tani has been president of 
the byu Law School Alumni 
Association since 2010 but has 
been involved almost since 
graduation. When she was only 
a few years out of law school 
she volunteered to be class 
representative, and she later 
became the chair of the events 
committee. In 2008 she was 
elected vice president of the 
Alumni Association—during a 
board meeting she didn’t attend. 
She learned of the appointment 
when Mary Hoagland sent her a 
congratulatory e-mail. She was 
surprised but happy to continue 
serving. Tani became president-
elect in 2009 and president in 
2010. As an immediate past 
president when her term ends in 
fall 2011, Tani will still sit on the 
Alumni Executive Committee.
 As president, Tani has 
focused on making connections 
with alumni in each region, 
and she has made it a priority 
to connect alumni to the Law 
School. Several initiatives have 
been to use social media, to link 
the alumni newsletter with the 
Law School’s web page, and to 
add videos to the newsletters. 
She wants new graduates to feel 
immediately part of the Alumni 
Association and to serve on 
committees and as committee 
chairs, since they are the future 
leaders of the organization.
 In the tough job market, 
Tani encourages alumni to 
feed potential jobs into Career 
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Services for new graduate place-
ments. She beats the bushes 
for clerkships, internships, and 
externships for the 2ls. “It is 
important to keep the doors 
open for the people coming 
behind us.” In another Alumni 
Association hiring initiative, 
alumni throughout the country 
have been asked to host Dean 
James Rasband at their law 
firms. His presentations focus 
on the Law School and its stu-
dents—their high lsat scores 
and grades, where they’ve come 
from, and what their plans are; 
the credentials of the faculty 
and the new faculty; and the 
new building projects at the 
Law School. Tani hosted one of 
these presentations at the Utah 
State Capitol, where all the state 
attorneys attended. Tani says, 
“It is very exciting to bring the 
Law School into law firms and 
offices and let others see what 
is happening there. It is very 
impressive.”
 Unlike her earlier law 
firms, Tani has always seen 
women active in the Alumni 
Association. Two other women, 
Mitzi Collins and Wendy 
Archibald, have also served as 
presidents. She believes there is 
great value in participation for 
both men and women because 
of the networking and profes-
sional associations inherent 
in this service. “I have grown 
close to people I didn’t know 
in law school. Some of my clos-
est friends have come through 
my service to the Alumni 
Association.”
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During the past three years, I’ve been a quiet, diligent student. I tried 
not to bother too many people. 
I didn’t speak in class unless 
spoken to. So I wasn’t surprised 
when I heard the rumor that I 
had been chosen to speak today, 
because some people at the Law 
School were under the impres-
sion that I couldn’t actually talk 
and saw this occasion as their 
last chance to confirm it. In my 
defense, I’ve spent the last three 
years surrounded by 150 people 
who know—full-on know—
deep down in their hearts and 
spirits that they are right about 
everything. And they are dying 
for the chance to prove it vocally. 
Those of you who have lived 
with or around a law student can 
attest that it’s hard to get a word 
in. So, I’m honored to have this 
chance to speak, and if anyone 
behind me raises their hand and 
wants to make a point that they 
think has been overlooked, I’m 
going to ignore them. 
 As an undergrad at byu, I 
worked in this concert hall as a 
stage manager. I worked events 
like this one, and many times I 
had to move grand pianos back 
and forth across the stage during 
a performance. More often than 
not, after I finished my moving 
and got the piano into place, I 
received a modest bit of applause 
from the audience. I think 
people were genuinely amazed 
that I didn’t push the piano right 
off the edge of the stage. More 
likely, they were amazed that I 
was able to move it at all, being 
Wheels to Keep Us Moving
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so small and pathetic. Many 
times people would make com-
ments like, “I don’t know how 
you manage to move those pia-
nos around so easily. They’re so 
heavy.” My response was always 
the same: “They’re on wheels. 
I mean, the pianos have nice 
wheels. I’m not carrying them 
on my back.”
 A similar thing has often 
happened over the past three 
years. I tell people that I’m in 
law school, and then I have to 
spend some time convincing 
them that I’m actually studying 
to be a lawyer and not a court 
reporter or a 911 
dispatcher, but 
an actual lawyer. 
But once I have 
them convinced, 
they usually 
say, “Oh, law 
school sounds 
so difficult. I 
don’t know how 
you do it, being 
so small and 
pathetic.” Oh, 
and they usually 
say, “Bless your 
heart,” a few 
times in there 
somewhere. 
 In addition 
to being mildly 
offensive, these 
people are right, 
and I think my classmates would 
agree with me that for the past 
three years we have all been strug-
gling with something that’s too 
heavy and awkward to manage 
alone. But I don’t know anyone 
who has done it alone. We have 
had spouses, friends, children, 
parents, siblings, neighbors, and 
each other. In short, over the past 
three years, we all have had peo-
ple in our lives, wheels to keep us 
moving. I think many of them  
are here tonight.
 So while I know that gradu-
ates often need words of hope 
and praise on this big day and 
that messages of repaying debts 
and doing good in the world 
have their place, the message I 
bring to you today is one of grati-
tude—not just of gratitude in 
today’s moment but as a continu-
ing part of life. From this group 
on stage will emerge talented, 
successful, competent attorneys 
working and serving in many 
places and in many fields. They 
will run businesses, whole states, 
banks, homes, classrooms, and 
much more. But if I have to give 
advice today, it is this: when you 
reach these heights and along the 
way, don’t imagine that you did 
it on your own. One of my favor-
ite poets, Walt Whitman wrote 
that pursuing self-sufficiency kills 
gratitude. I think he is right.  
In all your success, I hope you 
can allow yourself to need  
other people and acknowledge 
them for what they are: the 
wheels that keep you moving. 
 But for today, I know that 
my classmates are all feeling 
grateful, not just to be done 
(which, rest assured, they are 
feeling), but grateful for you—
you as groups and as individuals.
 Now, of course it’s impos-
sible for every graduate to get 
to say what he or she is feeling 
tonight, but if they could, if 
given a chance, I think most 
of them would have a similar 
message. For instance, I asked 
Autumn Begay, a woman whose 
quiet strength I admire, what 
she would say today. Here it is:
 First and foremost, I want 
to thank my wonderful husband, 
Jeremy. Hun, your encouragement 
and support have been steadfast. 
Through all the late nights studying 
and weekends consumed in school, 
you were my greatest support and 
strength. You carried me through the 
rough spots and championed my suc-
cesses. This journey has been as much 
yours as it has been mine. I love you.
 To my sweet little Elijah, you 
were literally with me in class from 
day one of your existence. Your birth 
and sweet spirit have brought me per-
spective and joy.
 Mom and Dad Smith, you have 
always made me feel that I could 
aspire to great heights. Thank you 
for all of your love and your support. 
Your encouragement throughout my 
life has meant so much.
 Mom and Dad Begay and all 
of the Begay clan: that you are here 
today means so much to me. Your 
excitement for me fills my heart with 
joy.  Finally, my wonderful class-
mates, I don’t know how to express 
how grateful I am to you. You 
each are so amazing and inspiring. 
I truly treasure your friendships. 
We have come a long way together 
from that first nerve-racking day 
at law school. I want you to know 
how much I admire and respect you. 
Thank you! 
 I asked my friend Tyler 
LaMarr (who was the first per-
son who showed me how to 
really study) what he would say 
today, and, being a man of few 
words, he said this: 
 Thank you, Mom and Dad, 
for teaching me about the things 
that are so much more important 
than law school, and thank you, 
Yumi and Naomi, who are my most 
important things.
 Finally, I asked Rachel 
Miller, someone whose kindness 
I have admired and benefited 
from since our first semester.  
She asked me to say this:
Mom and Dad –
 I owe it all to you. I was incred-
ibly lucky to grow up in a terrific 
Idaho home where reading, think-
ing, and discussing was the family 
evening routine. The lessons of hard 
work, integrity, and faith I learned 
at home have become the bedrock 
of my academic success and future 
aspirations. No matter what age or 
degree I attain, you will always be 
my loving and wise parents, whose 
examples I will try to follow. Love 
you, Mom and Dad. Thanks for 
everything!
 It would be lovely if we 
could go on until each graduate 
got to say to their families and 
supporters what I know they’re 
thinking. But some of us are 
probably getting hungry and 
want to move this thing along. 
But while I have your attention, 
I hope you will forgive me and 
indulge me while I say some 
thanks of my own. 
 When I started law  
school, my husband had 
recently passed away, and I 
was lost. But I came here with 
my son, and we started some-
thing new, something that my 
husband wanted for us. My 
parents gave up two years of 
retirement to help me through 
it. I could not have finished 
one week, let alone three years, 
without them or the rest of  
my family. Thank you.
 Those are the people that 
kept me moving at home. It 
took a whole other set of people 
to keep me going at school. I 
think this group saw, right away, 
how lost and broken I was, and 
they carried me. They let a tiny, 
weird little widow join their 
group and learn from them. 
After three years I think of them 
as brothers—brilliant, evil, 
genius brothers, whom I don’t 
want to see or talk to for at least 
two weeks. Thank you.
 Finally. I want to thank my 
son, Luke. He has put up with a 
lot in the last three years and will 
likely put up with more. Luke, 
you are my favorite person in the 
whole world, and I’m going to 
keep working to prove it to you 
every day. 
 To my classmates, thank 
you all and congratulations. 
•••
This speech  
was given  
at the J.  
Reuben  
Clark Law 
School  
convocation  
held in  
the de Jong  
Concert  
Hall at byu  
on April  
22, 2011.
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An acquisitions librarian at the    Hunter Law Library for the 
past 25 years, Bonnie Geldmacher 
is one of four Brigham Young 
University employees to receive 
the President’s Appreciation 
Award in August 2011.
 Geldmacher’s colleagues 
describe her strongest traits as (1) 
her consistent dedication to her 
work, (2) her ability to prudently 
economize in library purchasing, 
(3) her devotion to her student 
byu law library faculty David Armond, 
’04, and Shawn Nevers, ’05, won 
the aall Call for Papers Award in 
the Open Division this year. They 
presented their winning paper, “The 
Practitioners’ Council: Connecting 
Legal Research Instruction and 
Current Legal Research Practice,”  
at the annual conference of the 
American Association of Law 
Libraries in Philadelphia this past 
July. Shawn Nevers previously 
won the same award in the New 
Members Division in 2007.
 The article grew out of ideas 
the two had discussed for ways to 
improve teaching legal research 
in first-year legal writing and 
research classes. They wanted 
input from practitioners who 
were using research skills every 
day in their profession. In 2009 
they invited lawyers to be part  
of a Practitioners’ Council to 
advise them about current legal 
research practice. 
 “You mean you want to make 
law school reflect what we actu-
ally do in practice?” an attorney 
responded to their invitation to 
be part of the council. Armond 
and Nevers are experts in using a 
variety of legal resources, but they 
wanted a connection to current 
legal research in law practice.  
The council, made up of seven 
practicing attorneys, now acts 
as an advisory board regarding 
current research practice and 
provides real-world insight and 
experiences to enhance teaching. 
 The council meets for lunch 
with Armond and Nevers during 
the year in brainstorming sessions 
where differences between aca-
demic and client-based research 
are highlighted. Practitioners have 
shared what feature they use most 
often in electronic researching, 
skills they think new attorneys must 
have, and ways to avoid the same 
mistakes practitioners often make. 
 Armond and Nevers continue 
to use the Practitioners’ Council 
to inform their teaching. Their 
perspective on assignments 
has changed. “We found that 
our checklist approach to legal 
research skills needed more refine-
ment. Not only would we need to 
develop assignments that required 
finding a statute, but also the exer-
cises would have to teach the stu-
dent how to develop sensitivity for 
how difficult the discovered statute 
would be to apply. Not only would 
time limits need to be part of the 
micropracticums, but also we 
would need to teach students to 
be aware of how timing increases 
the difficulty of assignments. The 
Practitioners’ Council helped us 
to understand the metacognitive 
elements of a task we were likely 
to take for granted.”
employees, and (4) her repeatedly 
going the extra mile in many areas.
 “Ms. Geldmacher is very adept 
in supervising staff and student 
workers,” says fellow law librarian 
Galen Fletcher, ’93. “She was the 
head of the Technical Services 
Department at the law library 
from 1998 to 2002, during which 
time she coordinated the depart-
ment’s successful migration to a 
new library system while oversee-
ing two faculty librarians, other 
staff, and students. Her work was 
recognized with the Law School 
Employee Award in 2000.” He 
adds, “Bonnie has been an abso-
lute jewel in her efforts to train 
and work with student employees 
over the years. Her students stay 
in touch with her because of 
her care and focused attention 
to them during their time here 
and long after graduation. Every 
summer, ex-employees stop by 
specifically to see and thank her.”
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N ine graduates of J. Reuben Clark Law School have been 
called to serve as mission presi-
dents throughout the world.
1 Jeffrey G. Boswell, ’76, with his 
wife, Shirley J. Boswell, has been 
called to preside over the Baltic 
Mission. Boswell is a shareholder 
with Kimble, MacMichael & 
Upton in Fresno, California.
2 Jordan W. Clements, ’82, is 
a managing partner of a private 
equity investment firm. He and  
his wife, Julie A. Clements, 
are serving in the Minnesota 
Minneapolis Mission.
3 Fred D. Essig, ’82, has been 
called as mission president over 
the Chile Santiago North Mission, 
where he serves with his wife, 
Mary Ann S. Essig. He is a partner 
in the firm Dixon & Essig in Salt 
Lake City.
4 David L. Glazier, ’81, share-
holder at Kirton & McConkie in 
Orem, Utah, is president of the 
El Salvador San Salvador Mission 
with his wife, Beverly B. Glazier. 
5 Jon M. Jeppson, ’76, with his 
wife, Bonnie B. Jeppson, serves 
in the New Jersey Morristown 
Mission. He is a cofounder of the 
law firm Matheson, Mortensen, 
Olsen & Jeppson in Salt Lake City.
6 Michael A. Neider, ’76, and his 
wife, Rosemary C. Neider, preside 
over the Nevada Las Vegas 
Mission. He is president of Miro 
Industries, Inc., in Sandy, Utah.
7 Evan A. Schmutz, ’82, a mem-
ber manager of Hill, Johnson & 
Schmutz in Provo, Utah, presides 
over the Philippines Cebu Mission 
with his wife, Cindy L. Schmutz.
8 Karl M. Tilleman, ’90, with his 
wife, Holly B. Tilleman, is presi-
dent of the Canada Vancouver 
Mission. He is a managing partner 
at Steptoe & Johnson llp in 
Phoenix, Arizona.
9 Mark A. Wolfert, ’83, serves 
in the Georgia Atlanta North 
Mission with his wife, Carol A. 
Wolfert. Residing in Orem,  
Utah, he is partner and general 
counsel for dōTerra International. 
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The Clark Memorandum welcomes the submission of short essays and anecdotes from its
readers. Send your short article (750 words or less) for “Life in the Law” to wisej@law.byu.edu.
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John Borrows, Drawing Out Law: A Spirit’s Guide 
( u n i v e r s i t y  o f  t o r o n t o  p r e s s ,  2 0 1 0 )    > > > > >   Reviewed by Scott Cameron
I have long felt that the Clark Memorandum should be a vehicle for introducing the 
writing of its members to the Law Society as a whole.
 John Borrows was a visiting professor of law at byu Law School during fall 
semester 2007. As a fellow of the Trudeau Foundation, he was able to work on two 
of his books, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution (University of Toronto Press, 2009) 
and its companion volume, Drawing Out Law: A Spirit’s Guide, during his semester 
here. In the former volume, Borrows recognizes Canada as “a legally pluralistic state” 
and seeks to explain the significant role that indigenous legal traditions should play 
in Canada. The companion volume, Drawing Out Law, is an episodic narrative that 
combines biography, oral tradition, dream, pictography, and theology to convey the 
power of Borrows’ own Anishinabek legal heritage. 
 To demonstrate three strategies that contemporary indigenous people may employ in Canada, one of Borrows’ 
episodes describes a political meeting where indigenous candidates for Parliament relate their views. After the can-
didates speak, an elder relates the following: 
 In the old days, we used to weave lessons from the natural world into our teachings. Our leaders would expand our understanding 
by telling stories. They understood that stories could appropriately combine reason and emotion when they correlated with one another. 
We need more true stories to help us make sound decisions. . . . Our hearts and minds have to line up when we make a decision; these 
men are not helping us. They [the candidates] are too one-sided, too focused on reason alone. Stories may be hard for some to under-
stand, and may be too open-ended for others, but that’s part of their beauty. They generate innovation and creativity. They leave some 
of the work in making judgments to those who are listening to them. Stories don’t force your mind to the speaker’s conclusions in the 
same way that words alone do. Stories respect a person’s agency. I wish more of our people would function in this way again. [215]
 Borrows follows the Elder’s advice; he weaves lessons from the natural world into his narrative. He informs the 
“heart and mind” of the reader through stories, dreams, and pictographs. Drawing Out Law is an odyssey of the spirit 
that the narrator, a young law professor, takes through the Four Hills of Life. The reader accompanies the professor 
in his odyssey as he is guided to a deeper understanding of his Anishinabek culture and legal heritage by his grand-
parents, Nokomis and Mishomish. The reader is beckoned along with the professor to sit at their fire and hear their 
stories—eventually being encircled in the Anishinabek worldview. As the narrative concludes, the young professor 
watches Nokomis and Mishomish ascend the last hill, gaze back at their own valley, and see Anikee (Thunderbird). 
The professor’s love for them is evident, and the reader’s admiration is transformed into reverence.
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